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Introduction

1. In September 1950 three members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, Rade Zigic, Dusan Brkic, Stanko Canica-Opacic, and a certain Bogoljub Rapajic, editor of Srpska Rijec, were arrested by the police, charged with pro-Cominform activities and economic sabotage and expelled from the Communist Party of Croatia.

2. Rade Zigic was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party and of Croatia. [redacted] he joined the Communist Party at an early age before the war.

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During the war he filled various political appointments, ending up as Political Commissar of the Second Yugoslav Army. After the war, he was appointed Minister of Heavy Industries in the Republic of Croatia. During the reorganization of industry and administration which was initiated in Croatia in 1950, he was appointed President of the Council of Industry.

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3. Dusan Brkic, [redacted] was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party and of the Communist Party of Croatia. A lawyer by profession, he filled during the war various political and military appointments in Slavonia. After the war, he became Minister of Justice of the Republic of Croatia, and later Vice President of Croatia and President of the Legislative Council. Prior to the reorganization of Croatian industry in 1950 and the creation of a Croatian Council of Industry, Brkic, in his capacity as Vice President of Croatia, was responsible for industrial policy in Croatia.

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4. Stanko Canica-Opacic was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia. [redacted]

He joined the Partisans in 1941 and after the war became Minister of Building and later Minister of Forests and the Timber Industry in Croatia.

5. Bogoljub Rapajic held no Communist Party appointments. [redacted] he worked as a journalist in Zagreb before the war. After the war, he became secretary of the Serb Club in Zagreb and editor of Srpska Rijec published in Zagreb.

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6. Although, through the agency of the cell committees, the members of the Communist Party of Croatia had been warned beforehand to prepare the public for the impending expulsion from the Party of the above-named men, the warning came too late and the public was taken completely by surprise.

The Case against Zigic and his Associates

7. The case of the Communist Party of Croatia against Zigic, Brkic and Canica-
Spacic may be considered as follows:

- a. That they were Cominformists in that they praised Stalin and the USSR after the Cominform resolution against the Yugoslav Communist Party.
- b. That, as Cominformists, they had attempted to sabotage Croatia's economy.
- c. That, as Cominformists, they had attempted to destroy the unity of the Communist Party of Croatia and the Yugoslav Communist Party by pursuing a policy of Serb chauvinism.

8. In a speech to the Croatian parliament on 11 September 1950, Bakaric, Prime Minister of Croatia, claimed that Zigic and his associates had supported the Cominform resolution against the Yugoslav Communist Party ever since it had been passed in 1948, and that proof of this lay in a speech Zigic made in November 1949 at the Zagreb theater before a gathering of the Party hierarchy in honor of the October Revolution. In this speech, made at a time when the Tito-Cominform quarrel was at its height, he went out of his way to praise the USSR and hail Stalin as an "infallible genius."

9. [redacted] 50X1-HUM
Bakaric suspected Zigic and his associates of pro-Cominform leanings long before Zigic's panegyric of Stalin in November 1949. As a matter of fact, Zigic was chosen to speak in honor of the October Revolution with the express purpose of finding out exactly what he thought of Stalin and Stalinism.

10. Another fact which finally persuaded Bakaric that Zigic and his associates were in sympathy with the USSR and Stalin was their attitude toward the Korean war. Reportedly, Bakaric had found out that Zigic and his associates had confided to their most intimate friends that they were opposed to Yugoslavia's policy on the Korean problem; that they approved Gromyko's declaration of policy and Russia's obstructionist tactics in the UN; that they considered North Korea's attack on South Korea as one of the main moves to drive capitalist-imperialism out of Asia; that they were convinced that Russia would liberate Europe after she had dealt with Asia, and that they regarded the Red Army as the most powerful in the world, an army which could beat the Yugoslav Army and conquer Yugoslavia in a few days.

11. In his speech at an extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, held on 10 September 1950, Bakaric described how Zigic and Brkic had attempted to sabotage Croatia's economy. He gave details of how Zigic had defied the orders of the Federal Planning Commission to concentrate the resources of the Republic in building up the heavy industries and had, instead, permitted the Republic's raw materials and resources to be squandered not only on building up local industries of secondary importance, particularly in the Serb districts of Croatia, but also on manufacturing quality goods in small quantities instead of cheap goods in large quantities. As a result of this policy progress on the heavy industries in Croatia had been very seriously hampered and in Croatia there was a greater shortage of consumer goods than in any other republic of the FNEJ. Thus, for example, work on the Vinodol power station and the Sisak steel plant was very much behind schedule, and great difficulty had been found in redeeming the coupons given to peasants in exchange for food which permit them to buy manufactured goods at greatly reduced prices.

12. In addition, Zigic had deceived Boris Kidric and the Federal Planning Commission. In April and May 1950, Belgrade issued orders to all the Republics to suspend work on all industrial projects except major ones of Federal importance. At the same time, Kidric invited Zigic to Belgrade

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and asked him to explain why the general level of industrial production in Croatia was so low and why progress in the heavy industries was so slow. Instead of telling the truth and admitting that he had distributed Croatia's raw materials so badly, Zigic placed the whole blame for the serious state of Croatia's economy on an overall shortage of raw materials and skilled labor. He hinted that if Kidric and Tito gave up some of their "grandiose" ideas about building new heavy industries, Yugoslavia's economy, and Croatia's in particular, would soon improve.

13. Zigic had consistently opposed Yugoslavia's export policy which provided for the export of goods, particularly timber, at a price well below production cost. Quite obviously, Zigic did not realize - or did not want to realize - that Yugoslavia had to export at competitive prices if she was to import the capital equipment she needed for the Five Year Plan. Zigic's attitude was merely another sign of his opposition to the Five Year Plan and to the building up of heavy industries in Yugoslavia.
14. For economic, political and national reasons, the Yugoslav Communist Party has always sought to preserve friendly relations between the various national groups in Yugoslavia. It was this policy which very largely contributed to the success of the Partisan movement during the war and which brought the Yugoslav Communist Party to power.
15. The Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party is very conscious of the fact that any attempt to revive the latent hatred that exists between the Serbs and Croats may well have a disastrous effect on the relations between the Communist Party of Croatia and that of Serbia, may lead to the disintegration of the Yugoslav Communist Party and, worst of all, may tempt many members of the Communist Party of Serbia to seek support from Serbia's traditional ally, Russia, or, in other words, to turn towards the USSR and the Cominform. For these reasons Tito has consistently emphasized that any attempt to stir up hatred between one national group and another will be ruthlessly suppressed.
16. The history of Tito's fight against Zigic's Serb chauvinist tendencies goes back to 1941, if not earlier. In 1941, Rade Koncar, the Political Secretary of the Communist Party of Croatia was shot by the Italians at Sibenik and was succeeded by the Organization Secretary of the Party, Andrija Hebrang. Later, in the same year, Hebrang called a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia at Lika which Zigic attended. The meeting was marked by a very violent quarrel between Hebrang and Zigic which clearly revealed that they represented respectively the Croat and Serb chauvinist wings of the Communist Party of Croatia. Hebrang accused the Serbs in Croatia of collaborating with the Cetniks and letting down the Partisan movement, and Zigic accused Hebrang of throwing Serbs into the arms of the Cetniks by pursuing a policy of outrageous Croat chauvinism. The result of this quarrel was that the Partisan movement stagnated, so much so that Tito published an open letter in which he condemned the chauvinist tendencies in the Communist Party of Croatia as being responsible for the poor progress of the Partisan movement in Croatia. The situation changed but little until Hebrang was arrested by the Ustashe in Zagreb in the first half of 1942, and Bakaric succeeded him as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia. Bakaric admonished Zigic, abandoned the chauvinist policy pursued by Hebrang, and, by working for friendly relations between the Croats and Serbs, succeeded in developing the Partisan movement into a very powerful political and military force.
17. Because Bakaric was well aware of the dangers of Serb chauvinism in the Communist Party of Croatia, he went out of his way after the war to please the Serb wing in the Croatian Party. In relation to the size of their respective populations, he appointed a far greater proportion of Serbs than Croats in the highest positions of the Croatian administration and the Communist Party.
18. Nevertheless, Zigic and his associates remained unsatisfied, and deliberately pursued a policy calculated to stir up hatred between the Croats and Serb minority in Croatia. They claimed that the Communist Party of Croatia did not respect the rights of the Serb minority in Croatia and discriminated

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economically and politically against them. Because Zigic and his associates obtained little support for their policy from the Serb members of the Croatian Communist Party and the Croatian mass organizations, and still less from the strongly pro-Tito Serb Orthodox Church lead by the Patriarch Vikentije Prodanov, they turned to the Serb peasant minority in Croatia.

19. From time to time they visited the districts which they represented in Parliament, Serb districts which included Titova Korenica, Udbina, Podravska Slatina, Slavenska Pozega, et cetera, and openly sympathized with the peasants' complaints against the forced sale of crops to the government. In public speeches which they made in these districts they condemned the forced sale of crops in the Serb districts of Croatia on the grounds that during the war these districts had been devastated by the Ustasas and had not been rehabilitated since the war in the same measure as the purely Croat areas of Croatia. They claimed that the inhabitants of the Serb districts of Croatia should be exempt from compulsory labor and from the operation of the laws affecting mobilization and direction of labor because these districts had suffered so much during the war both in the way of property and manpower. So far as the kolhoz or state cooperative farms were concerned, they pressed for better terms for the peasants: instead of the peasant being allowed to retain his house, half a hectare of land and livestock sufficient to meet the immediate needs of his family and not exceeding one cow, five sheep, two pigs, et cetera, they demanded that the peasant be allowed to retain, as his own inalienable property, one house, five hectares of land, five cows, thirty sheep, and as many pigs as he wanted.
20. The extent of Brkic's pro-Serb chauvinistic feelings may be judged by the following incident which took place in June 1950. Brkic, in his capacity as director and supervisor of the construction of armament factories in Croatia, visited the new armament factory under construction at Samobor/Dregana, and among other things asked the colonel in charge of construction why he was building so many wooden huts for "those Croat swine", as he described the Croat workers, and suggested that they should sleep in the woods. This remark made by a prominent member of the Central Committee of the Croatian Communist Party made a deep impression.

Conclusion

21. Once Zigic and his associates had been expelled from the Party, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia did not find it very difficult to take advantage of the widespread anti-Cominform feeling in the country in order to interpret their actions as part of a widespread Russian/Cominform plot to destroy Yugoslavia's economic, political and national unity. Zigic and Brkic were blamed for the slow development and poor results of Croatia's economy and, taking advantage of the deep hatred that exists between the independent peasants and the urban and industrial proletariat, Zigic's defense of the Serb peasant was interpreted not only as a defense of a greedy capitalist class that exploited the proletariat by selling agricultural produce at exorbitant prices, but also as an attempt to foster Serb chauvinism and destroy national unity. In short, Zigic and his associates were branded as Cominformists, and because the Communist Party of Croatia published ample details of the affair and satisfied popular curiosity, the public, which is overwhelmingly anti-Cominform, soon lost interest in them.
22. Though the general public may have lost interest in Zigic and his accomplices, it does not necessarily follow that the Party has done so. Two questions inevitably arise:
- Why did the Communist Party of Croatia permit Zigic and Brkic to retain their key positions in the Party and in the Republic's economy, if it knew all along that they were Cominformists?
 - If the Communist Party of Croatia really believes that Zigic and Brkic were Cominform agents, is it seriously worried about the possibility of there being other Cominform agents in key positions, and what steps does it propose to take to liquidate them?

23. The answer to the first question is that there is absolutely no documentary

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or concrete evidence that Zigic and his associates were ever conscious Cominform agents. Bakaric, who knows Zigic well, is convinced that, although Zigic was definitely pursuing a policy calculated to favor the Cominform, he did so out of motives of Serb nationalism, a nationalism which blinded him to the Party line and which inevitably led him to regard the USSR as Serbia's traditional ally, regardless of the fact that she was also the head of the Cominform. The reasons, therefore, why Bakaric allowed Zigic, Brkic and Canica-Opacic to retain their key positions in the Party are because he considered them deviationists, not Cominformists, who had "misunderstood" the Party line, but who would sooner or later see reason and return to it; because he wished to avoid giving the impression that the Communist Party of Croatia was discriminating against the Serb elements in the Party, and because he desired, if possible, to avoid a public scandal which would reveal internal disunity in the Party and would only provide the Cominform with additional propaganda ammunition. Bakaric decided to expel them when he realized that they were not prepared to modify their chauvinist views, and that, in pursuance of these views, they had reached a point when they might risk seeking contact with the USSR and the Cominform.

24. The answer to the second question is that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia does not believe Zigic and his associates were Cominformist agents in touch with the Cominform, nor is it particularly worried about the possibility of there being other Cominform agents in key positions. The Central Committee had been aware of Zigic's views since its celebrated meeting in 1941 under Hebrang's presidency.